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setting that mirrors a real-life situation, but with, for example, the 
experimental design manipulating particular factors of interest in 
exposures of different groups of subjects to the experience.
Here we argue that immersive virtual reality is especially inter-
esting for the study of how people respond to violent incidents 
where a perpetrator attacks a victim. We are interested in the 
circumstances under which bystanders are likely to intervene 
in order to prevent harm to the victim. Immersive virtual real-
ity provides an ecologically valid setting in which to study this 
issue while at the same time removing the problem of physical 
danger, and overcoming the many ethical issues involved in the 
study of violence.
In the rest of this paper we ﬁ  rst brieﬂ  y review some of the lit-
erature relating to responses to violence in desktop based systems 
such as video games, before going on to describe what we mean by 
immersive virtual reality, and how this is profoundly different with 
respect to engaging people in realistic responses to virtual situa-
tions. Next we review one experiment where participants inﬂ  ict 
violence on virtual characters in immersive virtual reality, a reprise 
of the Stanley Milgram obedience experiments. Next we apply these 
ideas to new research that is using virtual reality to study bystander 
responses to violent incidents, and we describe some qualitative 
results from ongoing pilot studies. Finally we discuss recommen-
dations for the use of virtual reality in the study of violence. Our 
experiments discussed in this paper have been approved by the 
UCL Research Ethics Committee.
INTRODUCTION
There has been a long-standing methodological debate in social 
psychology contrasting laboratory-based experiments with obser-
vational data based on studies of natural occurrences in the ﬁ  eld 
(Anderson and Bushman, 1997; Anderson et al., 1999). This is espe-
cially the case in the domain of the study of violence and aggression, 
the focus of this paper, where particular laboratory procedures 
for the investigation of aggression remain a matter of controversy 
with arguments on both sides, for example (Ferguson et al., 2008; 
Giancola and Parrott, 2008; Ferguson and Rueda, 2009). It has been 
argued that while lab-based experimental studies can have internal 
validity, they are typically not generalisable to ‘real life’, they are not 
‘ecologically valid’ (Schmuckler, 2001). Studies of events in the ﬁ  eld 
are ecologically valid (they are based on events that have actually 
happened) but are likely to have low internal validity, with results 
based mainly on correlations from which it is difﬁ  cult to extract 
causal relationships because of the lack of control of confounding 
variables. It has been argued before (Loomis et al., 1999; Blascovich 
et al., 2002) that immersive virtual reality offers a possible way 
out of this problem for psychology and social psychology since 
there is evidence that people tend to respond realistically to virtual 
simulations of real-life events, but on the other hand, the portrayed 
situation is completely under the control of a computer program 
that can be designed to present scenarios conforming to a labora-
tory controlled experiment. Hence both internal and ecological 
validity may be possible using this technology – an experimental 
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VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR IN VIDEO GAMES
The vast majority of research on violence in the context of digital 
media has been concerned with the extent to which the engagement 
with violence in video games might increase the chance of people 
engaging in aggressive acts in real life. This type of research has a very 
long history going back to the 1950s when there was concern about 
the effect of television on children (Himmelweit et al., 1958) with 
studies in particular concentrating on the possibility that exposure to 
violence on TV causes violent crime – for example (Messner, 1986) 
who found this hypothesis not to be supported. In recent years the 
preoccupation with the impact of violent content in TV has shifted 
to the effects of playing violent video games where results appear to 
suggest that there is an effect: that exposure increases physiologi-
cal arousal and propensity to aggression (Anderson and Bushman, 
2001) and that high trait aggressive individuals are more prone to 
be affected than low trait aggressive individuals (Bushman, 1995; 
Anderson et al., 2008). Anderson et al. (2003) go so far as to say that 
the evidence is ‘unequivocal’ that exposure to violent media posi-
tively impacts aggressiveness amongst youth. However, some of these 
results have been called into question as the product of publication 
selection bias (Ferguson, 2007a, 2009). Moreover Ferguson et al. 
(2008) provide evidence against the ecological validity of one of the 
standardized tests used in the laboratory, the Taylor Competitive 
Reaction Time Test (TCRTT), where the experimental subject 
enters into a reaction-time competition with an opponent, setting 
an electric shock level that the opponent would receive upon losing a 
particular round (and likewise receiving shocks from the opponent) 
– the opponent in fact being a confederate or computer program. 
(There are variations of this test using sound blasts rather than 
electric shocks). Their results suggest that there is non-  signiﬁ  cant 
statistical correlation between scores of aggression obtained from 
the TCRTT and trait aggressiveness, and that the measurements 
obtained from the test do not clearly measure the degree of aggres-
sion exhibited in the experiment.
Whatever the validity of such laboratory-based tests it has to be 
admitted that such procedures are very far from events in real life. 
It is argued that such tests can be thought of as abstractions from 
the complexities of real life, and that when employed in theory 
and hypothesis guided conﬁ  rmatory studies they can provide us 
with valuable insight into some of the mechanisms and relation-
ships involved in the production of aggressive behaviour. However, 
they still fall far from the mark in providing any conﬁ  dence that 
people would actually act in the predicted way when confronted 
with events that they know to be naturally occurring rather than 
in the constraints of a laboratory (with all the known, given, and 
explicitly stated controls that pertain therein). One alternative 
to this paradigm is to assess the thoughts and feelings evoked in 
people during stressful experiences – for example, the Articulated 
Thoughts During Simulated Situations paradigm where subjects 
are encouraged to voice their thoughts and feelings in real-time dur-
ing such events (Davison et al., 1983). This has been employed, for 
example, in comparing the different beliefs and cognitive biases of 
men who are violent or non-violent towards their spouse (Davison 
et al., 1983), and dating violence amongst teenagers (Rayburn et al., 
2007). Other approaches that rely on people’s verbal reports look 
at how they say they would behave when confronted with a real 
situation – for example (Laner et al., 2001), and a questionnaire 
approach to how a rape prevention program inﬂ  uenced prosocial 
behaviour in the context of bystander intervention is exempliﬁ  ed 
by (Banyard, 2008).
Methodological approaches for the exploration of violent 
behaviour include on the one hand experimental paradigms that 
abstract away from real-world issues to focus on highly speciﬁ  c 
features of an artiﬁ  cial situation, and on the other, methods based 
on verbal reports and questionnaires in response to descriptions or 
video viewing of a situation – see also (Levine, 2003) for a review 
of different methodologies. We believe that each of these exhibits 
a kind of ‘reality gap’ – that the lab-based experiments may suf-
fer from the problem of ecological validity, and the verbal report 
methods cannot take into account the fact that people may not act 
in the way that they say they would when actually confronted by a 
real situation. In a study relating to bystander intervention Levine 
et al. try to bridge the reality gap by placing experimental sub-
jects into real-world scenarios that closely relate to the bystander 
 situation – in this case a confederate wearing (or not) a particular 
football team shirt faked an injury, and the experimental subjects 
all recruited from fans of that team were observed with respect 
to their degree of intervention to help the victim (Levine et al., 
2005). This does not show directly how people would behave in 
a situation regarding violence, but does help to elucidate factors 
involved in promoting prosocial behaviour – such as in-group and 
out-group identiﬁ  cation.
IMMERSIVE VIRTUAL REALITY AND THE REPRISE OF 
MILGRAM’S OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENT
An immersive virtual reality (IVR) system is functionally and ideally 
one that displays life-sized simulated environments consistently in 
all sensory modalities, that completely surround the participant, 
and where the displays are a function of real-time body tracking, 
in particular head-tracking. There are various types of system, the 
most common being head-tracked head-mounted displays and 
stereo surrounding projection systems generically referred to as 
Caves (Cruz-Neira et al., 1992). An overview is given in Sanchez-
Vives and Slater (2005), with a conceptual review of virtual environ-
ments presented in Ellis (1991). A critical aspect that we take as part 
of the very deﬁ  nition of an IVR is that such a system affords the 
possibility of perception through sensorimotor contingencies (SCs) 
(Noë, 2004) that approximate reality. In other words participants 
can use their body to perceive in much the same way as in physical 
reality – moving their eyes closer to a (virtual) object in order to see 
it more closely, moving their head to see past an obstacle, bending 
their whole body down in order to look underneath something, 
reaching out with their whole body and hands to grab something, 
and so on. This uniﬁ  es both the tracking and display capabilities of 
the system: realistic SCs require, for example, natural visual proc-
esses such as automatic head-turns in response to events in periph-
eral vision (thus peripheral vision must be enabled requiring wide 
ﬁ  eld-of-view displays), high visual resolution (otherwise looking 
closely at an object has severe limits), generalized haptic feedback 
(so that a collision with any part of the body can be felt) and so 
on. In reality systems in existence today offer crude approxima-
tions of natural SCs – perhaps only ﬂ  ight training simulators come 
anywhere close, typically being mixed-reality systems that deploy 
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We have argued elsewhere that when perception can be achieved 
through approximations to natural SCs participants can experi-
ence Place Illusion (PI), the illusion of being in the place depicted 
by the IVR (Slater, 2009). This illusion of ‘being there’ in the virtual 
scenario is most often referred to in the literature as presence (Held 
and Durlach, 1992; Sheridan, 1992; Barﬁ  eld et al., 1995; Ellis, 1996; 
Sheridan, 1996; Slater and Wilbur, 1997; Draper et al., 1998), but 
increasingly this term has come to be over-interpreted with many 
different meanings – including, for example, presence as a result 
of watching a movie (Hu and Bartneck, 2008) or even using an 
iPhone (Bracken and Pettey, 2007). By PI we mean strictly the 
strong illusion of being in the place depicted by the IVR system, 
a place where you can use your body to perceive as if it were a 
real place.
PI refers to a static aspect of the response to virtual reality – it 
endows the experience with a place-like sensation, but the envi-
ronment itself could be completely uneventful. Plausibility (Psi) 
refers instead to the dynamics within a virtual environment, to the 
unfolding events. A Psi Illusion occurs when the events that are 
happening within the virtual environment are taken as real – not of 
course that participants believe that they are real but that they ﬁ  nd 
themselves exhibiting automatic behaviours and responses as if the 
events were real. For example, a human-looking virtual character 
talks to and smiles at a participant who in turn talks to and smiles 
back at the character knowing for sure that in reality there is no 
one there. Psi is a more difﬁ  cult illusion to engineer than PI. We 
believe that it requires the following features implemented within 
the IVR: First, correlational – that actions of the participant result 
in correlated reactions within the virtual world. For example, the 
participant stares at a virtual character who as a result stares back, 
or the participant walks through a crowd of virtual characters who 
move away in order to allow a path through for the participant. 
Second, self-reference, meaning that there should be aspects of the 
environment that contingently refer directly to the participant – for 
example, a character spontaneously speaks to or otherwise engages 
with the participant in a way that unambiguously signals the pres-
ence of the participant to the character. Third, and the most difﬁ  cult 
to achieve is credibility – that when the scenario depicts events 
that could happen in physical reality, that they unfold according 
to the knowledge and prior expectations of the participant. This 
credibility aspect typically requires a great deal of detailed domain 
knowledge on the part of the scenario designer.
It is our hypothesis that when PI and Psi operate together then 
participants will respond realistically to virtual events and situ-
ations: PI locates the participant within the virtual space, Psi is 
the illusion that what is happing there is real. Automatically, in 
spite of cognitive knowledge that nothing real is happening, people 
do ﬁ  nd themselves responding realistically to the IVR experience. 
This relates to the issue of construct validity in psychology research 
(Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) – which is concerned with the ques-
tion as to the extent to which a measure of a trait (e.g., ‘aggression’) 
really does measure what it is supposed to measure. However, in 
our approach to date the speciﬁ  c problem of construct validity does 
not arise, since we are not attempting to measure a trait but rather 
to observe how people do respond within virtual reality when they 
become a witness of a violent attack by one (virtual) person on 
another. The important issue is the extent to which the responses of 
people are generalisable to how they might behave when  confronted 
with a similar situation in reality. Our research rests on the theo-
retical framework discussed brieﬂ  y above, which suggests that such 
realistic behaviour is likely when there is PI and Psi, and we have 
given some pointers as to how these may be achieved. There is also 
a lot of evidence that people do respond realistically in virtual real-
ity, even to the extent that virtual reality has been successfully used 
in psychotherapy – for a review see (Rizzo and Kim, 2005). There 
are also several examples of this discussed in (Sanchez-Vives and 
Slater, 2005; Slater, 2009).
We consider an example now in more detail to illustrate these 
points in the context of violent behaviour – the virtual reprise 
of the Stanley Milgram obedience experiments (Slater et  al., 
2006). Milgram’s series of experiments carried out mainly in the 
1960s – the whole collection is described in depth in Milgram 
(1974) – examined the conditions under which an authority ﬁ  g-
ure might persuade ordinary members of the public to carry out 
actions that would harm a stranger. The scenario is very well-
known, and nearly 50 years after the original experiments, there 
is still   substantial reference to the original work which in spite 
of being highly   controversial, has had a major impact on social 
  psychology – for example (Benjamin and Simpson, 2009; Blass, 
2009) two of the six papers in the January 2009 issue of the 
American Psychologist journal devoted to Milgram’s  experiments. 
The basic paradigm was a supposed word-pair learning experi-
ment, where the learner was given an electric shock of increasing 
voltage each time he chose the wrong word as being paired with 
a cue word. The learner was a confederate, and the experimental 
subject administered the shocks. The question was how high a 
voltage would the subject administer to the learner – especially 
given the increasing and vociferous protests from the learner that 
he wanted to stop the experiment. In the basic condition 60% of 
subjects gave the maximum shock of 450 v. Due to the ethical 
outcry that followed publication of these results these experi-
ments have not been replicated, until a recent partial replication 
(Burger, 2009; Miller, 2009).
In 2006 we carried out one of Milgram’s conditions using an 
IVR system. The purpose was not to explore obedience as such, but 
rather to use the paradigm to explore the extent to which people 
would exhibit signs of realistic response, in particular stress at giv-
ing the shocks to a virtual character. The experiment was carried 
out in a Cave-like system, a Trimension Reactor which has three 
walls and the ﬂ  oor as projection screens that deliver a real-time 
surrounding stereo image to the participant as seen through stereo 
shutter glasses. The participants also wore a head-tracker so that 
the visual displays were updated as a function of head movement 
and head-gaze direction.
Figure 1A shows the setup of the environment. The learner was 
the virtual woman who would appear as if behind a glass partition 
in front of the participant who would be seated by the table on 
which there was located an ‘electric shock’ machine. The experi-
menter would sit to the right of the participant, and answer any 
questions during the course of the procedure. The participant’s 
view is shown in Figure 1B. It is important to realise that these 
pictures cannot convey the vital role of stereo vision and head-
tracking – by which the participant would perceive the environment 
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was a mixed-reality setup up, since the chairs, the desk, the shock 
machine, and the real experimenter were physically present, and 
the virtual scenario was blended together with this.
The cue word and four possible responses were shown on the 
wall in front of the participant as can be seen in Figure 1. For each 
of the 32 trials there was one cue word (the topmost one) and 
four possible responses shown underneath. The correct response 
was the one in capital letters. The participant read out all ﬁ  ve 
words to the learner, and she then responded with one of the 
four words. If the answer was the wrong one then the participant 
was instructed to advance the voltage on the shock machine by 
one unit, and press a button on the machine to administer a 
shock. In response to the shocks the learner would show signs 
of becoming increasingly uncomfortable eventually demanding 
that the experiment be stopped. There were 23 participants in 
this ‘visible condition’ who saw and interacted with the virtual 
learner throughout and 11 in a ‘hidden condition’ who saw the 
virtual character for a short introduction, and then interacted 
with her only through text.
Regarding the Psi components both the correlational and self-
reference aspects were satisﬁ  ed. Throughout the visible condition 
there was action on the part of the participant that met with a 
response from the virtual learner – when responding to each trial 
by providing the word answer, and when responding with pain 
and complaints to the pressing of the shock button. The learner 
also made unsolicited comments to the participant. For example, 
after the experimenter reminded the participant that if the learner 
does not answer the question then this should be taken as an 
incorrect answer, she addressed the participant directly saying: 
“Don’t listen to him, I want to stop now!” and there were several 
other such interventions.
Of the 23 participants in the visible condition 6 withdrew before 
completing the experiment, but none withdrew in the hidden con-
dition. The results showed that those in the visible group became 
more physically aroused and with greater stress than those in the 
hidden group, as shown by analysis of skin conductance, heart 
rate and heart rate variability. Moreover, when the learner did not 
answer on the last two trials participants in the visible group waited 
signiﬁ  cantly longer before administering the required shock than 
those in the hidden group – providing further evidence that at 
some level they were treating the situation as real.
One question asked of the participants after their experience was 
‘How much did you want to stop on a scale of 1–10 where 1 means 
you had no thoughts at all about stopping and 10 means you really 
desperately wanted to stop?’ This is important since although only 6 
out of 23 actually did stop, more than half said in answer to another 
question that they had wanted to stop, but typically did not do so 
since they kept reminding themselves that it was only virtual reality 
and an experiment. Hence their feelings about stopping could be a 
useful indicator of their actual state of mind that was not reﬂ  ected in 
all of their observed behaviour. Another important subjective vari-
able was based on the Autonomic Perceptions Questionnaire (APQ) 
(Mandler et al., 1958) where participants assessed their own physi-
ological state marking their degree of agreement to 24 statements 
on a continuous scale (‘trembling or shaking’, ‘face becoming hot’, 
‘perspiration’, and so on). Higher scores represent greater awareness 
of such states, and the overall APQ score is the difference between 
the means of the one immediately after the experience and that 
beforehand. We found that there is a positive correlation between the 
wanting to stop question and the APQ score (r = 0.49, P < 0.02) sug-
gesting that perceived greater physiological discomfort was one of 
the factors that led people to want to stop. Participants also answered 
a standard questionnaire with three components: (PI) Five questions 
relating to the sense of being there (situation) six questions about 
their responding realistically to the situation (e.g., ‘How much did 
you behave within the training room as if the situation were real?’), 
and (virtual learner) six questions about how much they felt that 
they responded realistically to the virtual learner (e.g., ‘How much 
did you behave as if the character were real?’). These were all scored 
on a Likert 1–7 scale, where 7 was the most afﬁ  rmative answer. We 
found that there was no signiﬁ  cant correlation between the mean 
of the answers to the PI questions or the situation questions and 
the ‘wanting to stop’ score. However, there was a signiﬁ  cant positive 
correlation with the realistic responses to the virtual learner ques-
tions (r = 0.47, P < 0.025), a result mostly accounted for by two 
questions: ‘How much did you ﬁ  nd yourself automatically behaving 
FIGURE 1 | Setup of the Milgram Paradigm in Virtual Reality (A) showing the layout of the Trimension Reactor system, and (B) the view from the point of view of 
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as if the character were real?’ (r = 0.53, P < 0.01), and ‘How much 
was your emotional response to the character as if she were real?’ 
(r = 0.46, P < 0.03). There is no signiﬁ  cant correlation between the 
APQ and mean response to virtual learner scores (r = 0.27, P = 0.21). 
The results suggest that when the participants were aware of physi-
ological responses that were appropriate to the stressful situation 
(e.g., ‘Increases in intensity of heartbeat’, ‘Bodily reactions becom-
ing bothersome’) and when they found themselves automatically 
behaving towards the character as if she were real including realistic 
emotional reactions, that this made the situation unpleasant enough 
that they wanted to stop. Each of these factors relates to what we have 
called Psi: internal feelings that are appropriate to the situation, and 
automatic responses as if real to the virtual character.
BYSTANDER RESPONSES IN IMMERSIVE VIRTUAL REALITY
Using the Milgram paradigm to explore people’s responses to 
extreme situations in IVR was the precursor to our current stream 
of research, which is concerned with an exploration of bystander 
behaviour in violent emergencies. The study of bystander behaviour 
arose out of the murder and rape of Kitty Genovese in 1964 while 
apparently 38 bystanders did nothing in response to her cries of 
help (Latané and Darley, 1969). The phenomenon of bystander 
non-intervention has been a subject of signiﬁ  cant research in social 
psychology ever since. The issue is still, unfortunately topical today, 
for example, in October 2009 there was a similar case in Richmond 
California, where apparently 20 bystanders did nothing during a 
violent rape that they witnessed1.
Of course it is very difﬁ  cult to study such bystander behaviour 
experimentally. Levine et al. (2002) provides a review of earlier 
bystander literature, and a description of two related video-based 
experiments. In virtual reality participants can be placed in a situ-
ation in which a perpetrator violently attacks a victim in order to 
explore how they respond to this. In particular we concentrate on 
football-associated violence, with manipulation of in-group and 
out-group afﬁ  liations.
The scenario we are developing, at the time of writing in its pilot 
phase, involves the participant entering a virtual reality depiction of 
a bar. A character (V) approaches the participant and engages him 
or her in a conversation about football (Figure 2A). In the in-group 
situation the character V wears an Arsenal football shirt and par-
ticularly discusses the Arsenal team, and in the out-group situation 
FIGURE 2 | The confrontation in the virtual bar from the viewpoint of the volunteer – (A) the eventual victim ﬁ  rst speaks to the volunteer (B) a man 
previously seated (the eventual perpetrator) approaches the victim (C) the perpetrator acts aggressively towards the victim (D) eventually pushing him violently 
against the wall.
1http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/10/27/california.gang.rape.investigation/
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V wears a neutral shirt and talks generally about football. All of the 
participants would be Arsenal fans. After this brief   conversation a 
second male character (P) who had been sitting alone by the bar 
suddenly stands up and moves towards V (Figure 2B). These are 
the ﬁ  rst few lines of the ensuing conversation:
P:  Oy, you got a problem?
V: Sorry?
P:  I said, have you got a problem?
V: No  mate.
P:  Yeh well I saw you looking at me.
V:  I didn’t look at you.
P:  Well I saw yuh, I saw yuh staring.
V:  No I wasn’t staring at you.
P:  Something to get off your chest?
V: No.
P:  You sure about that?
V:    There’s nothing wrong mate, there’s no trouble here, I’m just 
trying to enjoy a quiet pint.
P:  Yeh that’s what I was doing, enjoying a quiet pint.
V:  Go back to your table and enjoy a quiet pint –
P:  Who the *** are you to tell me to go back to my table?
V:  I’m not trying to tell you what to do.
Over the 2 min and 20 s of the scenario the assault by P(erpetrator) 
becomes increasingly threatening, in language (with signiﬁ  cant shout-
ing and swearing), and aggressive gestures (Figure 2C), until ﬁ  nally 
the perpetrator begins to violently push V(ictim) against the wall 
(Figure 2D). In terms of body size, gestures and also voice tone, the 
overall demeanour of P is threatening and aggressive, and that of V is 
submissive and wanting to avoid trouble. However, whatever answer   
is given by V, P uses this to escalate the argument to a more dangerous 
level. It is important to note that from the point of view of the volunteer 
the virtual characters are life-sized (Figure 3), displayed in 3D stereo, 
with movements based on motion capture from real people, and voices 
that are recordings from actors. Since the volunteers are head-tracked 
the characters can be programmed to look them in the eye.
Our fundamental question concerns the extent to which the 
 participant, an unrelated bystander, would attempt to intervene, and 
how this propensity to intervention might vary with his in-group or 
out-group relation with the victim as determined by whether or not 
the victim is an Arsenal fan. This in-group/out-group classiﬁ  cation 
utilises the football shirt mechanism of (Levine et al., 2005).
To date, as we have been developing the scenario we have been 
carrying out informal trials with volunteers, who enter into the 
environment and then are interviewed afterwards. They are told 
beforehand that this is not a formal study but rather a contribution 
to our emerging experimental design, and they are also warned 
about its realistic and violent content. These volunteers recruited by 
word of mouth from around the University are typically not Arsenal 
fans, and in many cases are not even football fans, thus the in-group/
out-group factor has not been explored. Our purpose at this stage is 
to get some idea of the types of response that may be expected, and 
also where technically we need to improve the scenario itself.
Two actors provided the voices of the characters, their move-
ments were captured by the use of a Vicon motion capture sys-
tem, and applied to the virtual characters. So overall the gestures 
and movements of the characters are quite realistic though with 
some anomalies such as the lack of any detailed hand movements 
(the hands are not motion captured), no eye blinks, and also no 
lip synch, so that when the characters talk their mouths do not 
move (however, their gestures clearly indicate who is talking at 
any moment). The scenario was controlled by an operator unseen 
by the participants who, during the initial conversation between 
V and the participant, could select the utterance and its timing 
from a palette of pre-recorded phrases. Normally the conversation 
would follow a set pattern, but sometimes participants would say 
something unexpected, and a set of general responses (such as ‘very 
interesting’) could be triggered by the operator.
The scenario is rendered in the Trimension Reactor system depict-
ing a bar, and the participant is free to move around the space, with 
head-tracking enabled thus supporting almost natural sensorimotor 
contingencies for visual perception. The initial conversation sup-
ports some degree of Psi – the character talks to the participant in 
a seemingly ad lib conversation – for example, on entry into the bar 
the conversation (for one participant, X) started as follows:
V:  You all right mate?
X: Oh,  hello,  yes.
V:  Good. Where you from?
X:  Uh, Kent originally.
V: You’re  Arsenal  yeh?
X:  Yeh yeh sure.
V: Get  you!
X: [laughing]
V:  What do you think of the team last year?
X:  Well they got better as the season progressed.
V:  Totally agree with you. When did you last go and see a match?
X:    Um well, I’m on the waiting list for a season ticket, but I went 
to see a pre-season friendly last year.
V:  Come on mate, really?
X: Yeh.
V:  Who’s your favourite player?
…
FIGURE 3 | The virtual characters are life-sized and can look the volunteer 
in the eye. This ﬁ  gure is for illustrative purposes, since the volunteer would 
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However, once the confrontation between P and V begins 
there is no further intervention that the participant can actually 
make that would have any effect. During the pilot experiments 
we have manipulated one factor, which is whether or not V ever 
looks towards the participant during the course of the argument. 
V looks towards the participant ﬁ  ve times, each time for 1 s. Our 
hypothesis is that glances towards the participant will enhance the 
probability of the Psi illusion.
To date 25 volunteers have experienced the scenario, 13 of 
them with the glances activated and the remainder not. Although 
in fact there is nothing that the participants can do to change the 
course of the argument, they do not know this, and so an attempt 
at intervention is certainly possible. We have taken as signal-
ling an ‘intervention’ a statement towards the virtual characters 
by the participant, a physical attempt to intervene by reaching 
out as if to touch one of the characters, or moving their body 
directly into the ﬁ  eld-of-view of the characters. Also from the 
pilot studies we have realised that non-intervention may be the 
realistic response for some volunteers – since they explain that 
in a similar situation in real life they would not have intervened, 
and that they had the same thoughts in response to witnessing 
the simulation.
Of the 11 out of 25 who did intervene, 7 experienced the gaze 
condition and 4 did not. Three who did not intervene but said 
that they would not have intervened in reality were all in the non-
gaze condition. The remaining 11 who did not intervene were 
almost equally divided between the two conditions. The verbal 
interventions that occurred were as follows, each statement made 
to the perpetrator:
•  “Calm down mate, there is no problem here”.
•  “What’s wrong with Arsenal?”
•  “Come on mate, we were just talking about football”. He also 
put his hand out trying to reach the perpetrator a couple of 
times.
•  “Leave him alone”, “Relax”, and tried to reach him.
•  “I don’t think he was looking at you” and he tried to reach the 
victim.
•  “I am looking at you now”.
• “Relax”.
•  “Guys, there’s no point to ﬁ  ght” and “Calm down”.
General statements about their responses by the participants in 
the interview after the experience included:
•  The guy was overreacting, if it was a real situation I might have 
done more, I would have stopped it.
•  I had the same feeling about them as the feeling I had in a simi-
lar experience in the real life. I thought that they were acting 
stupidly.
•  I did not feel anxious, but it made me feel I had to intervene, I 
should say something.
•  First seconds of the conversation I was quite shocked.
•  I recoiled from both of them, I wanted to get away.
•  I had no feeling at all, but at the end, when the aggressor star-
ted acting wildly, I could feel my body temperature rising and 
the heartbeat rate slightly increasing.
•  I felt a bit uncomfortable. It was an intense clash between two 
people that does not make much sense to me.
•  I was feeling uncomfortable, not very pleasant being there.
•  I could feel my hands sweating.
•  I knew it was not real, so I did not want to intervene.
•  I felt a bit uncomfortable, I did not want to be there.
•  I felt a natural feeling that I wanted to do something.
•  I was quite scared that the aggressor would have turned around 
and looked at me. I felt like stepping into the discussion.
•  I was wondering if it was to involve me. I was feeling sorry for 
the guy with the red T-shirt. I thought I would have actually 
intervened (to test the system). I moved closer to the character 
to get into his ﬁ  eld-of-view. I felt quite uncomfortable.
•  During the confrontation, I was trying to get involved, but 
there was a detachment when I saw no interaction from them. 
From this point I felt more as a spectator.
•  Put hand out a couple of times, trying to reach P.
•  I had this strong feeling that I had to intervene. I noticed that I 
was moving as if I was between the two and I had to step back. 
More people around would have made me less likely to inter-
vene, because I do not want to embarrass myself.
•  I had the feeling that I wanted to do something, step in.
•  I felt this kind of paralysis when you are aware that something 
is about to happen, and you should do something, as in real 
life.
•  I was a kind of scared, I did not know what to do. I was thinking 
about whether to say something, but I was not sure if I could 
interact. I would have said something to defend the victim, like 
“he was not looking at you”. I had the feeling that I could not 
interact with them, like I was watching a movie.
•  I was the third party in there, but I was ignored.
•  I stepped back, as I would do in real life.
•  I felt anxious. I was more concerned about my own safety than 
for victim.
We noticed in very early pilot experiments that participants 
invariably suddenly started to look around at some moment, and on 
questioning them they said that they were looking to see if someone 
else was around in the scenario. Ten out of the 25 volunteers did 
look around, and we asked them about this:
Did you look around to look for other people?
•  Yes, when the confrontation starts, looking for an exit, to ﬁ  nd 
somebody else to talk to, to break off from the Arsenal guy 
because it seemed it would escalate violently.
•  Yes, frequently, I was scared about the possibility that more 
people would come and escalate it.
•  Yes, I was just exploring.
•  Both for help and somebody who would have engaged in the 
discussion.
•  I looked around looking for the barman a few times.
•  Looked for other people to try to stop it.
•  I glanced around to see if other characters would be introdu-
ced to see if somebody else would step in, whether to escalate 
or deescalate.
•  I looked around looking for somebody who might escalate the 
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•  Yes. I was checking the perimeter whether there would be 
somebody else, for no particular reason.
•  I looked around looking for an authority.
We asked: What would have made it more likely for you to 
intervene?
•  If there was more than one aggressor or the victim would have 
asked for help.
•  No, same in reality, I wanted to keep away.
•  I would not have intervened at all for any reason.
•  Nothing, I did not want to intervene.
•  I knew that I could not have any capability to do so, so I did not 
want to intervene.
•  If there were more people that I knew, or even more people in 
general.
•  If I had seen that it was a threat to myself.
•  If the victim would have asked for help or the aggressor would 
have been a threat to me.
•  I was expecting the victim to move away, but he did not do it. 
He did back up, but he did not move away.
•  If I would have known that my intervention would have chan-
ged something.
•  If the aggressor would have acknowledged me.
•  There was no reaction from the system.
•  If there had been tactile interface.
•  If the aggressor would have been smaller than me.
•  I was waiting for him (aggressor) to start something with me. 
It would have been different if the victim was a woman. But 
this guy was Arsenal and he was not… friendly. (Experimenter 
note: this unusual reaction of regarding the victim as unfrien-
dly was caused by the participant mishearing something that 
the victim had said earlier as an insult to himself).
•  If I would have been more involved by the aggressor. I did 
not get any feedback from my intervention, so I became more 
passive.
•  They were interacting physically, so I do not think I would ever 
had intervened, since my intervention would have been physi-
cal and I knew that was not possible.
•  If there would have been a response from them to my 
interventions.
•  Nothing would have made it any more likely for me to 
intervene.
•  If they would have been more aware of me, or if the victim 
would have asked me for help.
The most common item as reducing the overall credibility of 
the scenario was that there was no interaction with the participant 
during the confrontation (7 participants). Five stated that the dialog 
itself was not realistic. 10 drew attention to the lack of lip synch, 
8 to the lack of realism of the hand movements, 5 mentioned the 
lack of eye blinking, and there were other comments made by indi-
vidual participants.
There are two fundamental conclusions from this set of pilot 
trials. The ﬁ  rst is that in spite of the technical issues (e.g., the lack 
of lip synch) that a number of people did become quite involved in 
a realistic way in the scenario – they spontaneously made remarks 
(mainly to the perpetrator) that were clear signs of intervention. 
Many who did not intervene reported feelings and thoughts about 
intervention, or about their personal safety in that situation. The 
second major conclusion is that people are less likely to intervene if 
they know (from a technical point of view) that their intervention 
cannot achieve anything. This is a matter of Psi: their actions have 
no response, they move into the ﬁ  eld-of-view of the characters 
or attempt to reach out and touch the characters, or even talk to 
them, and nothing happens. As one participant said, once this point 
is realised the game is lost – the volunteer becomes a spectator 
rather than a participant, rather than a potential bystander. We 
have observed in other experiments that PI can be temporarily 
broken (for example, by reaching out to touch an object and feel-
ing nothing) but that it can quickly reform again once natural SCs 
continue to operate. However, once Psi is broken it typically does 
not form again – once Psi is lost the events in the scenario are no 
longer personally applicable to the participant (it becomes more 
like a movie).
DISCUSSION
It is not straightforward to develop a convincing virtual reality 
scenario for situations as complex as the ones that we are tackling. 
The good news, however, is that many aspects of the simulation can 
be technically wrong, but people still tend to have a range of realistic 
responses. For example, in the virtual reprise of the Milgram experi-
ment, no one could ever be fooled into believing that the virtual 
learner was real – she did not look like a realistic human, and did 
not behave like one – nevertheless the physiological and emotional 
responses to the situation were strong. We believe that the most 
critical issues to get right are those that are concerned with what 
we have termed ‘Plausibility’ (Psi). The participants must realise 
that their actions can have appropriate responses in the virtual 
world, that they themselves are recognised as being in that world 
since events spontaneously are directed towards themselves, and 
ﬁ  nally the scenario itself has to be credible, one that ﬁ  ts with the 
beliefs, expectations and experiences of reality. PI is a necessary 
condition for realistic responses, but it is not sufﬁ  cient. Moreover, 
much past research into presence has confounded these two quite 
distinct aspects of the experience: being there on the one hand, and 
the realness of what is happening there on the other. We maintain 
that the former is relatively easily attainable through providing a 
system that affords almost natural sensorimotor contingencies for 
perception, but the latter requires very careful design informed by 
knowledge of the domain being simulated.
As we argued in (Slater et al., 2006) the gap between reality and 
virtual reality is what makes these experiments possible from an 
ethical point of view. If participants could not distinguish between 
reality and virtual reality, if their responses were identical in the two 
cases, then we would have returned to some of the ethical problems 
raised by Milgram’s original experiments. However, here participants 
know that they are operating within a simulation, and although there 
is deception (virtual reality necessarily deceives the senses otherwise 
it could not work at all) it is a paradoxically explicit deception known 
to all involved. However, if responses of people are not exactly as 
they would be in reality, are we not back to the problem of ecological 
validity? Can we really generalise from virtual reality experiments to 
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violent situation, that in the future you might behave differently 
from how you behaved in the simulation. Hence such an experience 
might open the door to self-reﬂ  ection and minimise the chance for 
later inappropriate, ineffective, or dangerous behaviour. However, 
this is an empirical question, not one that can be settled by argu-
ment or simple introspection.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have brieﬂ   y reviewed some methodological 
approaches to the study of violent situations, and we have argued for 
a methodology that employs the presentation of simulated scenar-
ios through IVR. Virtual reality has the power to transport people 
to another place, and give them the illusion that what is happening 
there is real. To the extent to which this can be realized, virtual real-
ity offers the possibility of carrying out laboratory-based controlled 
studies that also have a greater degree of ecological validity com-
pared to more traditional lab-based approaches that tend to work 
within paradigms that are far removed from real situations with 
respect to their content. A major beneﬁ  t of using virtual reality for 
these types of studies is that it is very easy to control and manipulate 
many different variables. For example, in our bar scene currently 
the perpetrator is quite large and looks dangerous, but it would be 
straightforward to make him look smaller and weaker. How would 
that affect the propensity to intervention? We can also manipulate 
the environment, by having virtual bystanders, who behave in dif-
ferent ways under different experimental conditions.
Moreover it should be noted that such environments (apart from 
being useful for studying bystander behaviour) may also be useful for 
rehabilitation, both of victims and bystanders themselves who become 
disturbed by their behaviour in response to a real situation. Virtual 
reality has already been used, for example, in the case of post- traumatic 
stress disorders (Rothbaum et al., 2001; Rizzo et al., 2005).
Careful design of simulated environments, and implementa-
tions that give participants the belief that they can actually effect 
changes in the virtual world, and that spark physiological, emo-
tional, behavioural and cognitive responses that are similar to what 
would occur in reality, present an interesting way forward in the 
study of extreme social situations.
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to have results with greater validity than thought experiments or 
watching and responding to videos that portray a scenario. In vir-
tual reality a person can actually live through a scenario, the types 
of thoughts and emotions that would be had in real life are likely to 
be generated (as we can see in some of the statements by volunteers 
reported above), even if they do not act out their responses through 
overt behaviours. This means that people are more likely to be able 
to reﬂ  ect in an informed way about how they might react in similar 
circumstances in reality – since the simulation in which they have par-
ticipated with their whole bodies engaged surely results in an internal 
mental simulation of how their responses would be. We argue that 
this provides a methodology that is more likely to lead to generalis-
ability than either carrying out lab-based actions that are very far 
removed from reality or basing inferences purely on what people say 
they might do in thought experiments or after video exposures to 
violent scenarios. Role-playing offers another similar methodological 
approach to virtual reality, but in fact is more expensive to set up in 
the long run, and does not offer the ﬂ  exibility nor reproducibility 
of virtual reality simulation based experiments.
It could be argued that these types of experiments are not ethi-
cal since they can cause stress to participants. However, we do not 
accept this argument. The participants are adults, who freely agree 
to participate in the study, and who are told that they are free 
to withdraw at any time, and even warned that they may expe-
rience stress. If they decide to continue in spite of experiencing 
stress that is their choice, they are under no obligation to con-
tinue. People voluntarily choose to engage in activities that are far 
more stressful than anything we have ever subjected them to in 
virtual   reality – watching horror movies, doing dangerous sports, 
even simply attending a football match might be a highly stressful 
activity. Our experimental participants are responsible for their 
own actions, and provided that they are not tricked or deceived 
into entering a situation that might cause them difﬁ  culties without 
forewarning, it is up to them to participate or not. Of course there 
are limits, and a major ethical consideration is to weigh up the 
beneﬁ  ts of the research in terms of knowledge gained balanced 
against any negative aspects of the experiment.
The other ethical issue is ‘desensitisation’ – by participating in 
these types of experiment could it make participants more likely to 
engage in or become indifferent to aggressive acts? As we have seen 
this question is an empirical one – does involvement in violent vir-
tual scenarios result in greater aggressive behaviour in real life? We 
saw above that this is an issue much studied with respect to violent 
video games, and the jury is still out – see, for example Ferguson 
(2007b). Also one could argue equally well that having experienced 
a virtual reality scenario where you found yourself carrying out an 
act that causes stress and unpleasant feelings to a virtual charac-
ter and ultimately to yourself, or where you were   confronted by a 
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